ABSTRACT: Foreign labour was an essential resource for the Nazi war economy: by September 1944, around six million civilian labourers from across Europe were working in the Reich. Any initial readiness on the part of the peoples of Nazioccupied Europe to volunteer for work in the Reich had quickly dissipated as the harsh and often vicious treatment of foreign workers became known. The abuse and exploitation of foreign forced labourers by the Nazi regime is well documented. Less well understood is why women formed such a substantial proportion of the labour recruited or forcibly deported from occupied eastern Europe: in September 1944, a third of Polish forced labourers and just over over half of Soviet civilian forced labourers were women. This article explores the factors influencing the demand for and the supply of female labour from the Nazi-occupied territories of the Soviet Union, particularly after the appointment of Fritz Sauckel as Plenipotentiary for Labour in March 1942. It explores the attitudes of labour officials towards these women workers and shows how Nazi gender politics and the Nazi hierarchy of race intersected in the way they were treated.
clear from studies hitherto whether labour officials thought there were any limits on what even women workers deemed to be 'racially inferior' could be expected to do. highlight what may appear as a straightforward logic of substitution that governed Nazi wartime efforts to keep the economy in the Reich and in the occupied territories supplied with labour. At the same time, the insights of gender historians alert us to the singular paradoxes at work in the racist Nazi 'rationality' that constructed Soviet women workers as endlessly flexible and interchangeable 'hands'. These paradoxes may help illuminate further the correlation between the imagined hierarchy of race and the recruitment of female labour. In the 1980s, Gisela Bock showed how theories based on both 'racial hygiene' and racial anthropology attenuated the polarity of the sexes in their construction of 'inferior' human types or racial groupings. 22 She argued that this assumption -that 'inferior races' lacked the polarity of the sexes characteristic of the 'superior' peoples -was at work in the regime's treatment of foreign women workers. Along with Polish women, Soviet women were constructed as the 'other' of German womanhood within the wartime workforce, with Jewish women and Sinti and Roma women being regarded as lower still in the Nazi hierarchy of race. However, such constructions were bizarrely inconsistent: stereotypes of Soviet women could conjure up both the 'asexual phantasm' of an endlessly exploitable 'work hand' and fixate with racist obsessiveness on their supposed hyperfecundity.
Regional studies of German
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The attention paid by historians of gender to the question of women's bodies and their reproductive as well as productive capacity has also informed research on Nazi policies on race, sexuality and population: this in turn opens further perspectives on the deportation of Soviet (and Polish) women to work in the Reich. In one view, forced labour and mass labour deportations also served to attack the 'biopower' of remained under military administration. 33 In a succession of decrees from August 1941 onwards, a labour obligation was imposed on both sexes: this initially covered
Jews aged 14-60 and non-Jews aged 18-45: the age range for non-Jews was subsequently extended. 34 With the mass murder of Soviet Jews already under way, the Nazi occupiers saw forced labour for Jews as a short-term interlude before these workers, too, would be murdered and replaced as workers by non-Jews. 35 In the first phase of occupation, Jews and non-Jews, the latter including women with children and the elderly, were drafted into 'work columns' deployed on road-building, infrastructure repair, or snow clearance.
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As the Nazi assault on the Soviet Union stalled from the autumn of 1941 onwards, more and more German men had to be called up to replace the men lost on the Eastern Front, leaving ever more gaps in the war economy. 37 Soviet prisoners of war were the first to be considered as a labour supply, but by the beginning of hazardous work, with German women shifted to lighter tasks. 73 In this way, German women workers were given an improved position in the hierarchy of the wartime workforce, with new categories defined by race and nationality extending the hierarchy downwards below them. 74 The labour administration was engaged in many respects in a 'race to the bottom' in the way it sought to turn foreign female labour into 'pure' labour, boundlessly deployable. The new Maternity Protection Law of May 1942 and the 'housework day' introduced by the Labour Ministry in October 1943 were attempts to manage, rationalise and reconcile the multiple roles of German working women as mothers, in the household and in production. 75 These measures were simultaneously designed to differentiate the female workforce further along lines of 'race' and nationality. Foreign women were excluded from such measures: they were denied family life and deprived of basic elements of privacy. Their bodies were exposed to scrutiny and inspection from the moment of deportation to repeated inspections in their barracks accommodation. 76 They were exposed to sexual exploitation and could be punished for sex with Germans, even where evidence suggested this was coerced. allowing 'western' women workers to continue to travel back to their country of origin, while this was ruled out for Polish women and 'Ostarbeiterinnen'. 78 In a as a handy source of domestic help in their private households, deploying them out of hours cleaning windows or cleaning up after the decorator. 83 Not all firms reacted the same way to being supplied with female workers.
Some companies complained at being sent women when they had requested foreign men, and requested them to be swapped. Rebutting such complaints, the labour administration noted that there was nothing to be done about the high proportion of women and youngsters under 18 among the 'Ostarbeiter' transports: there was no prospect of swapping contingents of 'eastern workers' on the basis of age or physical capacity and it was up to the firms to reorganize production to ensure an 'optimal deployment' of the workers they had been sent. 84 When an aircraft factory complained that the 'Ostarbeiterinnen' it had been sent were not strong enough for the work, a scribbled exchange on the correspondence between the labour officials included the comment that 'The labour office in Saxony has no men to send, and anyway, the female Ostarbeiter are stronger than the men'. 85 Some taboos about deploying foreign women did remain in force. Whereas
Ukrainian women constituted 28.5 per cent of the workforce in the coal mines of the Donbass in German-occupied Ukraine in July 1943, working underground as well as in jobs on the surface, all women were banned from working underground in coal mines in the Reich itself. 86 This ban, declared a representative of the DAF, was based on the conviction that women could not be contemplated undertaking the 'singularly masculine' job of miners at the coalface even during wartime: this ban on working below ground applied to foreign women workers as well. 87 In this case at least, the gender of the foreign women workers was regarded as decisive. Issues about the permeability or impermeability of boundaries demarcating men's and women's work where foreign women workers were concerned also arose in shipbuilding. In the Bremen shipbuilding yards, as Renate Meyer-Braun has shown, German women, mostly female relatives of the male employees, had taken on jobs in production from the start of the war. However, it was the deployment of 'Ostarbeiterinnen' as welders that opened up the question of the taboo about women working on board the ships under construction. For the local labour office and the factory inspections officer, with the prospect of eastern European women welders working alongside men in the conditions on board ship that were particularly hard to oversee, the gender of the 'Ostarbeiterinnen' suddenly appeared relevant: the women came into view as women not as workers requiring protection but as a potential moral threat, an 'immoral' presence in a hard-to-supervise work situation. 88 In a further instance, this time in munitions production, questions of health and safety were brought into play in a discussion involving the deployment of 'Ostarbeiterinnen'. In an argument in 1942 between the regional labour office in Pomerania and the Air Ministry it was argued that 'Ostarbeiterinnen' should replace
German women producing grenades in a munitions plant: the German women, it was proposed, should be 'released' due to the dangerous gases to which they were exposed. The labour officials involved in the dispute took the view that 'Ostarbeiterinnen' with their supposedly more robust constitutions should indeed be employed rather than German women. However, rather strikingly, perhaps in a residue of earlier assumptions, the deputy director of the Pomeranian regional labour office made the point that the plant should invest in better ventilation, 'since after all even Ostarbeiterinnen should as far as possible be guaranteed some measure of health protection'. Allowing labour resources to vanish into the realm of private consumption thus had a political if not economic logic. Recruiting foreign servants no doubt also made sense to German middle-class housewives, given that ever fewer German girls and women wanted to accept the low wages and long hours of domestic service when other jobs beckoned. 95 A perception of the 'Ostarbeiterin' as a 'natural' servant also took root within the armed forces stationed in the occupied eastern territories. 96 Army units secured local women to work in their canteens, and officers started to recruit women for their own households as well, bringing them back to Germany when they went on home leave. In September 1942, once the Wehrmacht's conquest of a further swathe of Soviet territories gave Sauckel access to new supplies of labour, a meeting was held to confirm that the recruitment of domestic servants would now begin in earnest. It was noted at that meeting that the 'self-service' actions by members of the Wehrmacht were to be confirmed and legalized retrospectively. 97 By November 1942, however, the practice was seemingly getting out of hand and a ban was imposed on such 'private' recruitment. 98 Nevertheless, there was a countervailing logic as well. Given the rules and regulations regarding the surveillance and physical segregation of Polish and Soviet workers, their stigmatization through the P and OST badges and the insistence on maintaining social and sexual boundaries between them and Germans, placing Soviet women as domestic servants into German homes was problematic, all the more so given Nazi views of the German home reproducing Germanness through the intimacy of domestic life. 99 One answer, signalled in the decree that implemented the symbolically to drag the home into the realm of the regulated economy and the official gaze.
The first transport of domestic helps from Ukraine departed from Stalino (Donetzk) in September 1942. 107 Households seeking an 'Ostarbeiterin' as a domestic servant had to apply to their local labour office and have their political reliability checked by a Party functionary. 108 Those whose applications were approved were summoned to select 'their' domestic servant at the local labour office. 109 From then on, employers seem to have regarded themselves as in a position to treat their servants as they pleased. At any rate, a security service (SD) report in January 1943 suggested both the satisfaction of housewives at having a servant whom they could order around at will, and their lack of regard for regulations about separation and social distance.
Beyond recommending that Nazi women's organizations should be dispatched to inspect and admonish the wayward housewives, however, the report suggested little by way of remedial action: the reach of the regime in this case was inevitably limited. Coming back to the quotation and the question posed at the start, the instruction to recruit 'primarily women' can be seen partly as a simple reflection of the availability of women and absence of men in occupied Ukraine and Belorussia. It does not, despite some accounts, seem to be the case that transports from the occupied eastern territories were carefully put together to ensure a 'parity of the sexes'. Any sense of labour contingents being straightforwardly 'ordered' with a pre-set composition regarding skill, age or gender is belied by the shortages on the ground and the hostility to recruitment that soon set in. It seems, rather -taking the example of Graf Spreti in the Ukraine -that recruiters in the field had scope for pushing their own recruitment solutions upon their 'home' areas.
Up to a point -for instance in the case of the campaign to secure domestic servants -women in the occupied Soviet territories were recruited specifically as women for 'female' tasks. However, they were also recruited as a generic supply to fill gaps in the labour force regardless of gender. If employers requested skilled male labour and there was none available, the labour administrators sought to manage expectations but also promoted Soviet women as a substitute. Tamara Frankenberger has suggested that the 'Ostarbeiterin' was in many respects the embodiment of an women as servants again partly suggests a throwback to an earlier age when households could treat servants entirely as they pleased -but also a sense that these women were a novel resource absorbing the strains on Germans in wartime, part of the perks of empire brought into the German home.
